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Common law larceny required an intent to per-
manently deprive another of his property coincident
with the act of taking. To prevent dishonest men
from escaping criminal punishment in certain
cases where the intent was formed subsequent to
the taking, the English courts created the artificial
doctrine of continuous trespass. While maintaining
that this new fiction was implicit in the common
law definition of larceny, the judges made the law
of theft more indistinct and uncertain. The Lar-
ceny Act of 1916 apparently abolished the doctrine,
but the English courts revived it and, unfortu-
nately, they have subsequently extended its
application. In the United States, however, two
early decisions applied the doctrine to fact situa-
tions where it had never been used before, even
in England, and they thereby caused the doctrine
to fall into disuse, so that it is rarely invoked, ex-
cept in Alabama, where its application is construed
as broadly as it is in Britain.
I. INTRODUCTION OF THE DocTnmE:
THE RILEY DECISION
In 1853 Regina v. Riley' introduced the fiction
of continuous trespass into the English law of theft.
Riley had unwittingly and innocently driven to
market with his twenty-nine black-faced lambs a
white-faced lamb belonging to another.2 He no
doubt realized his error when a prospective buyer
pointed out that the flock numbered thirty; never-
theless, he sold the white-faced lamb along with
the rest. The Court for Crown Cases Reserved
unanimously affirmed Riley's larceny conviction
over the objection that the requisite animusfurandi
1 (1853) Dears. C.C. 149,22 L.J.M.C. 48,20 L.T.O.S.
228, 17 J.P. 69, 17 Jur. 189, 6 Cex, C.C. 88.
2There was a specific jury finding that the taking
was unwitting.
was not present at the time of the taking. In his
opinion, Baron Parke said:
The original taking was not lawful. The
prisoner being originally a trespasser, he con-
tinued a trespasser all along. . . and, being a
trespasser, the moment he took the lamb with
a felonious intent, he became a thief. He at
first simply commits a trespass; but as soon as
he entertains a felonious intent, that be-
comes a felonious trespass.3
Chief Baron Pollock added:
The distinction between the cases is this: if
the original possession be rightful, subsequent
misappropriation does not make it a felony;
but if the original possession be wrongful,
though not felonious, and then a man disposes
of the chattel animo furandi, it is larceny.4
Thus a trespass is said to be continuous so that
when the actor forms the intent to steal, there is
a coincidence of a taking and an intent to per-
manently deprive sufficient to satisfy the common
law requirement. The fiction was born in a situa-
tion where the defendant was ignorant of the
chattel's presence at the time of the taking. But
one immediately wonders why the same rationale
would not require conviction wherever the origi-
nal taking was a trespass at civil law, pre-empting
the common law requirement of act and intent in
all cases except where the original taking was pur-
suant to a right under the civil law.
The Riley decision has been criticized by many
of England's leading jurists of the criminal law,
3 (1853) Dears. C.C. 149, 158.
4 (1853) Dears. C.C. 149, 155.
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including Mr. J. W. Cecil Turner,' who argues that
the court rested its judgment upon inadequate
authority and faulty logic. In the first place, Tur-
ner maintains, there was no precedent for the
proposition that if the original taking be a tres-
pass a subsequent animus firandi would be suffi-
cient. Turner contends that it was Baron Parke's
vigorous confidence that swept Chief Baron Pollock
and the other members of the court into agreement
with a proposition that had no previous authority
and that, in essence, was contrary to the earlier
law. Even Hale, Turner notes, was apparently
unaware of the doctrine when he wrote:
If the sheep of A stray from the flock of A
into the flock of B, and B drives them along
with his flock, or by pure mistake shears them,
this is not a felony, but if he knew it to be
another's, and marks it with his mark, this is
evidence of a felony. 6
Turner also points out that the premise upon
which the fiction of continuous trespass rested in
Riley was dubious. At no time did the court treat
thoroughly the difficult issue of whether, in fact,
a trespass at civil law occurs when a person in-
nocently takes the chattel of another without
awareness of its existence. As one writer has asked,7
can I really be guilty of civil trespass when, as I
push my way through a crowded store, an article
falls from a counter into my coat pocket, shopping
bag, or trouser cuff without my knowledge? Modem
writers8 in tort law acknowledge, as did Hale,9 that
sometimes inevitable accident is a good defense to
a trespass action. On the facts of Riley, such a
defense was a real possibility since the taking of
the white-faced lamb was without the actor's
knowledge. Yet the uncertainty that existed at
the time of the Riley decision as regards such a
defense was not even mentioned.10
Finally, Mr. Turner criticizes the court for con-
fusing the concept of trespass with the concept of
5TURNER, nMODERN APPROACH TO CRnIINAL LAw
374-389 (1945). See also, 2 RUSSELL, CnrmE 1137-41(11th ed. Turner, 1958); and Edwards, Possession and
Larceny, 3 CuRR. L. P. 127 (1950).
61 HAT , PLEAS OF CRowN 507, cited with ap-
proval in People v. Devine, 95 Cal. 227,30 P. 378 (1892).7 Edwards, supra note 5, at 141.
8WhaizELu, TORT 50-53 (6th ed. 1954); SAeO ,
ToRTs 28-29 (12th ed. 1957); PROSSER, TORTS 117(2d. ed. 1955).
9 1 HALE, P. C. 506.
10 See generally PoLaocx, TORTS 96-105 (15th ed.
1951).
taking. Prior to Riley, judges had been quick to
note that the "taking and carrying away" require-
ment in larceny was a physical fact and not the
legal consequences of a physical fact. Common-law
larceny required a coincidence of an animtusfuravdi
with a physical taking, not with some fictitious
legal taking. As Turner says, guilt depended upon
the intent being coincident with a taking, and not
upon the intent being coincident with a civil tres-
pass. A distinction of importance, because the
Riley doctrine presupposes that a person who has
tortiously taken possession of a chattel commits
a fresh trespass against it each moment it remains
in his possession. The doctrine of continuous tres-
pass thus links the intent to deprive, once it is
formed, to the ever-recurring trespass and finds a
coincidence of intent and act sufficient to satisfy
the definition of larceny. But, as Turner says, the
doctrine cannot mean that there is a fresh taking
since a taking is a physical occurrence. The court's
facile association of "taking" with "trespass" de-
serves the criticism to which it has been sub-
jected.
I. TaE Docmnr's CoNTUED VITrrxiY
Mr. Turner hoped to convince the judiciary to
abandon the fiction of continuous trespass-a
difficult task, he conceded, because many of the
leading English and American criminal law com-
mentators had accepted the doctrine," even if
some misconstrued the ratio decidendi of the Riley
opinion." With the Larceny Act of 1916,13 it ap-
peared that his hope had been fulfilled. The Act
explicitly stated that a larceny conviction required
proof that there existed the requisite "intent, at
the time of such taking". 4 The Act neither ex-
pressly nor implicitly adverted to the continous-
U CLAnx & MARSHALL. Cnis 743-46 (6th ed.
Wingersky, 1958); 2 BIsnop, CmumAL LAW 638 (9th
ed. 1923); KENNY, OuTIaNEs or CRnmNAL LAW
300-02 (18th ed. Turner, 1962).1Kenny advanced the proposition that if "the orig-
inal taking of possession were in any way unlawful,
then any subsequent determination to appropriate the
thing will operate retrospectively, and will convert that
taking into a larceny. Even if the original taking were
no more than a trespass... a subsequent intent to ap-
propriate the thing so taken will thus relate back, and
render the act a larceny." KENNY, Oumnms or CRn=-
NAL LAW 243 (15th ed. 1936). In Riley there appears no
trace of any such doctrine of "relation back", for the
decision states that the taking arises when the inten-
tion to misappropriate is formed, and that the intent
does not relate back to the time when the original taking
occurred.
" 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 50.
14 Larceny Act of 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 50, §1 (I).
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trespass fiction, while, at the same time, it did
preserve many of the other common law fictions 5
The passing of the Riley doctrine was to be
heralded not because dishonest men would now go
free, but rather because it is a sound rule of crimi-
nal policy that the principles of the criminal law
should be rigidly observed by the courts. If our
system does not provide for treating as criminal a
particular course of conduct, it is for the legisla-
ture, and not the judges, to remedy the defect.
Despite the criticism that Riley evoked, and
despite the wording of the 1916 Act, the courts
would not let the doctrine of continuous trespass
die. With the approval of a unanimous court in
Ruse v. Read,16 this unprecedented theory became
an integral part of the English law of larceny. In
this 1949 case, the accused, having consumed a
large quantity of beer one night, rode away an-
other's bicycle. His defense was that at the time of
the taking he had not the intention of permanently
depriving the owner of his bicycle, but that upon
seeing it the next morning he panicked and con-
signed the bicycle by Rail to York "to be collected"
in his name.
The justices at first instance found him not
guilty because they believed he was too intoxicated
at the time of the taking to have formed the neces-
sary criminal intent. However, the Divisional
Court sent the case back to the justices for recon-
sideration. In delivering the judgment of the court,
Mr. Justice Humphreys declared:
It is clear that on the previous evening in
taking away the bicycle he had committed a
trespass since he had no permission from the
owner.
17
The Court cited with approval passages from
the opinions of Chief Baron Pollock and Baron
Parke in Regina v. Riley and continued:
15 "[Ihe expression 'takes' includes obtaining the
possession-
(a) by any trick;
(b) by intimidation;
(c) under a mistake on the part of the owner with
knowledge on the part of the taker that possession
has been so obtained;
(d) by finding, where at the time of the finding the
finder believes that the owner can be discovered by
taking reasonable steps." (Larceny Act of 1916,
6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 50, §1 (2) (i).)
The preamble to the act, announcing a purpose to
consolidate and to simplify, also supported the belief
that the doctrine of continuous trespass had been abol-
ished.
16 [19491 1 K.B. 377, 1 All E.R. 398.
17 [1949] 1 All E.R. 398, 400.
Being of the opinion that the decision in
Riley's case is still good law and binding on
this court, and the case is not distinguishable
from the present one, our judgment is that
the justices misdirected themselves and should
have found the offence proved. The case must
go back to them with that expression of opin-
ion. 1
One of the two alternative theories upon which
the Divisional Court endeavoured to justify the
Riley decision is noteworthy. The Court main-
tained that the accused had not taken possession of
the white-faced lamb until he became aware of its
presence.19 Then, by forming an intent to appro-
priate it at that moment, he became guilty of a
taking that was coincident with an intent to
deprive and was, therefore, guilty of larceny.20 At
least this rationale pre-empts less of the common
law definition of larceny since it is applicable only
in those rare instances where the accused was un-
aware of the chattel's presence when in came into
his "possession". This theory leaves untouched
all those cases where an intent to deprive is formed
subsequent to a knowing trespass.
III. AN UNWARPRANTED EXTENSION OF
THE DocnumNE
Whatever one thinks of the doctrine of contin-
uous trespass, the recent extension of that doctrine
in Regina v. Kindon ' cannot be condoned under
any circumstances. The accused argued that when
she and two friends had removed a large sum of
money from a drawer in an apartment where they
were being entertained, she had been too drunk to
form an intent to permanently deprive the owner
of the money. She conceded that such an intent
was formed when the money was subsequently
divided during a train trip to Doncaster. In
giving the judgment of the court, justice Byrne
reaffirmed the doctrine of continuous trespass
originally enunciated in Riley:
18 Id., at 402.
11 As, indeed, did Chief Baron Pollock in Riley, where
he applied the doctrine enunciated by Baron Parke in
R. v. Thurborn (1849) 1 Den. 387, 3 Cox, C.C. 453, as
an alternative finding: 'Here the taking of the lamb
from the field was a trespass; or if it be said that there
was no taking at that time, then the moment he finds
the lamb he appropriates the lamb to his own use."
[emphasis added.] Reg. v. Riley (1853) Dears. C.C.
149, 158.
20 This theory should be studied in connection with
the doctrine of larceny by mistake.
2 41 Crim. App. R. 208 (1957). See Comment, 1957
CRw. L. REv. (Eng.) 607; see generally, Prevezer,
Criminal Appropriation, 12 CuirR. L. P. 159 (1959).
[VCol. 59
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Applying the observations of Parke, B., in
Reg. v. Riley and which was cited in the Divi-
sional Court case of Ruse v. Read, it becomes
plain that the taking from the desk in the
dwelling-house, although not felonious, was
tortious, and the subsequent conversion of it
became larceny.Y
The accused was deemed guilty not of simple
larceny but of the more grievous offense of larceny
in a dwelling house.u In other words, the offense
was committed in the apartment and not on the
train! But the Riley decision, the facts of which
the Kindon court said are indistinguishable, postu-
lates that the accused commits the crime at the
moment he forms the felonious intent subsequent
to the trespass. Kindon, on the other hand, made
the subsequent intent retroactive, with the result
that the woman became subject to fourteen years
imprisonment instead of five." It would seem that
the justices in Kindon made a fiction of the fiction
of continuous trespass. They went beyond con-
necting an intent with a prior taking, in accordance
with the doctrine as previously developed, and
manipulated the doctrine to propitiate their convic-
tions of what conduct deserves a graver punish-
ment. We are thus once more confronted with an
example of the modem exercise of indirect legisla-
tive power by the judiciary, even to the extent of
overriding the express words of a statute.
IV. CoNTINuous TRESPASS IN THE UNITED STATES
There are three principal cases26 that are said to
have introduced the doctrine of continuous tres-
pass into the American law of theft. But these
three, together with a series of Alabama decisions,
26
are about the only American cases that uphold the
doctrine. This is surprising since in the United
States the common law definition of larceny has
either been adopted wholesaleP or else has been
2 41 Crim. App. R. 208, 212 (1957).
2 Guilty, that is, of violating Larceny Act of 1916,
6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 60, §13 (with a maximum punishment
of fourteen-years imprisonment) instead of §2 (with a
five-years maximum).
24 As to "relation back," the decision, in effect, ap-
proved the theory of continuous trespass as interpreted
by Kenny, supra note 12.
25 Comm. v. White, 65 Mass. (11 Cush.) 482 (1853);
State v. Coombs, 55 Me. (4 Virg.) 477, 92 Am. Dec.
610 (1868); Dozier v. State, 130 Ala. 57, 30 So. 2d. 396
(1901).
26 Dozier v. State, supra note 25; Fox v. State, 205
Ala. 74, 87 So. 623 (1920); Reynolds v. State, 245 Ala.
47, 15 So. 2d. 605 (1943).
27 For example, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4807 (1950)
makes larceny a felony, but it "does not define larceny.
It simply refers to larceny and the common law def-
absorbed by state statutes,21 which would suggest
that the common law fictions, including the doc-
trine of continuous trespass, are implicit within
the provisions of each state where not expressly
abregated by statute."
The disparity in the number of people in the
United States and in Britain, together with the
correspondingly greater number of crimes in
America, require the rejection of the suggestion
that the dearth of continuous trespass decisions
in America exists because facts analogous to the
Riley facts rarely occur in the United States. It is
the author's opinion, however, that the long
sustained silence" on the subject in most American
jurisdictions reflects a revulsion felt by the judi-
ciary towards the gross fiction of continuous
trespass.3'
It is also suggested that the rejection of the
doctrine in Maine and Massachusetts, which had
produced two of the early decisions supporting
the fiction, and its disuse elsewhere, has occurred
because those early decisions applied the fiction to
fact situations dissimilar to the Riley situation
and wrongly extended the doctrine to cases where
the original taking had been conscious. In Alabama,
however, the doctrine has thrived because it has
been limited to cases where the defendant, not
conscious of the chattel's presence at the time of
the taking, formed the intent to permanently
deprive as soon as he became aware of its presence.
Thus, for example, in the original Massachusett
case, 2 the defendant consciously drove away an-
inition applies." Comm. v. Doran, 145 Pa. Super. 173,
20 A.2d 815, 816 n.2 (1941). See also AI.A. CODE tit. 14,
§331 (1958); Aax. STAT. ANN. 41-3901 (1947).
2"See, e.g., I.. Rxv. STATS. ch. §16-1 (1965); ANN.
LAWS op MAss. ch. 266, §1956; N.Y. PENAL LAWS
§1290 (McKinney 1944).
29 This expectation is generally true, as is indicated
by Wilson v. State, 96 Ark. 148, 131 S.W. 336 (1910),
where the court conceded that the fiction of continuous
trespass might be a part of the Arkansas law of larceny
but found it inapplicable to the facts before it.
-0 Nor is there much literature in America on the
doctrine of continuous trespass, except for a brief
reiteration of the case law by some of the American
commentators. See generally CGARx & MARsmxr,
CR s 743-46 (6th ed. Wingersky, 1958P; 2 BIsHop,
GRaNAL LAW 638 (9th ed. 1923); 2 WH ToN, CRn-
nAL LAW Am PROCEDux 33-35 (12th ed. 1957);
PExsuS, GR=AL LAW 220 (1957); INBAI & SOWLE,
Gl=Au JusnTcE 238-39 (1960).
" See, e.g., State v. Riggs, 8 Idaho 630, 642, 70 P.
947, 951 (1902), where the court held erroneous an
instruction embodying the continuous trepass doctrine
and insisted that a felonious intent must have existed
at the time of the taking for a conviction to be sus-
tained; accord, State v. Hopple, 83 Idaho 55, 357 P.2d
656 (1960).32Comm. v. White, supra note 25.
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other's horse and wagon with an intent to appro-
priate it for his own use but without an intent to
permanently deprive the owner of its possession.
Subsequently, however, he formed and executed
an intention to sell the wrongfully obtained horse
and wagon. In upholding a larceny conviction, the
court purported to follow the rule of the Riley
decision:
In many cases the subsequent fraudulent
appropriation and conversion of goods, the
possession of which has been rightfully ob-
tained, does not constitute a felony. But if a
person by committing a trespass has tortiously
and unlawfully acquired possession of property
belonging to another, and afterwards con-
ceives the purpose of fraudulently depriving
the owner of it, and with felonious intent,
carries away and converts it to his own use, he
is guilty of the crime of larceny. While the
defendant was on his way to Bridewater...
he Was only a trespasser; but he made himself
a thief as soon as he drove away the horse, or
made any disposition of it, with a felonious
intent.n
Justice Merrick in the preceding passage no
doubt adequately stated the rule of continuous
trespass, but he then applied it to a fact situation
analogous to none in which any English court has
ever applied the doctrine. All the English decisions
are concerned with situations where the original
taking was innocent and unwitting. Neither Riley
3Id. at 485.
nor Read nor Kindon had knowledge of the
chattel's presence--due to intoxication or other-
wise-at the time of the taking. But in the two
early Maine and Massachusetts cases, such knowl-
edge was present at the time of the taking.34
It is my belief that the Riley judges intended the
doctrine of continuous trespass to be applied only
where the original taking is innocent and where
the intent to deprive is formed at the time the
chattel's presence becomes known. In England the
broad language of Riley has, in fact, been applied
only in such situations. The two early American
decisions, on the other hand, made real Mr.
Turner's fear that the common law requirement of
a taking and a contemporaneous intent to deprive
would be effectively destroyed by the use of the
continuous-trespass fiction in all cases where the
taking was wrongful. It is little wonder that after
those early American decisions, the doctrine of
continuous trespass fell into disuse in the United
States, except in Alabama, where it has been
more strictly construed.35
4 In State v. Coombs, supra note 25, the defendant
took another's team for his own use and without per-
mission, but with no intent to steal. He subsequently
formed that intent and was deemed guilty of larceny
on the continuous-trespass theory. The court cor-
rectly stated the doctrine but applied it to a case where
the original taking was with the actor's knowledge,
something not done in Britain.
35 In Dozier v. State, supra note 25, theAlabama court
correctly applied the doctrine to the only sort of situa-
tion where it should be invoked, that is, where the
original taking is without knowledge. Even though the
defendant had been too drunk to realized that he was
taking a barrel of whisky, the court said his conviction
for larcency was proper so long as he subsequently con-
ceived and executed the purpose to convert it felo-
niously to his own use.
[Vol. 59
